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Attribution, Socialization,
and Moral Decision Making

Richard A. Dienstbier
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

The position developed in this chapter resembles that taken by Aristotle more
than that taken by most modern psychology theorists, for our discipline has
tended to approach moral behavior and thought as if two quite different topics
were at issue. Modern psychological approaches to moral behavior have tended
to focus almost entirely on the emotional mediation of avoidance and upon
avoidance behavior, whereas moral judgment theorists have tended to isolate
themselves from both emotion and behavior, concentrating instead on verbal
expressions of moral judgments. Aristotle suggested a more integrated view that effective moral training should first involve the young child's emotional
dispositions, so that the child learned t o love and hate correctly; later when
maturation allowed reasoning to emerge, there would be a "symphony between
habituated preferences and what reasoning shows t o be good" (Fortenbaugh,
1975, p. 49). In an attempt to account for that "symphony" between habituated
preferences and reasoning in the realm of morality, this chapter's theoretical
development deals with the interplay between emotions and cognitions about
emotions, using emotion attribution theory concepts.
The initial issue of this chapter centers upon what constitutes a moral decision,
and whether moral decisions and situations should be defined on the basis of
specific significant behavior by the actor (e.g., cheating, stealing, killing) or
upon a more complex basis. Research is presented that supports the more complex approach by demonstrating that when moral values are made salient,
cheating (usually thought to be clearly morally relevant) either increases or
decreases, depending on certain specific attributes perceived in the temptation
context. It is concluded that a complex attributional analysis of situations from
the individual's viewpoint is very important in establishing the relevance of moral
values to decision making in various contexts.

The largest portion of the chapter deals with research indicating that causal
attributions about the sources and meaning of emotional arousal determine the
impact of that emotional response in moral decisions and behavior for adults
and children. Finally, the effectiveness of various socialization techniques for
both normal and psychopathic individuals is analyzed, using emotion attribution
concepts.
DEFINING MORAL SITUATIONS

What is morality? What constitutes a moral decision? What unique attributes
must a situation appear t o have before moral values and constructs are elicited?
The issue is sufficiently complex that it is not solved by simply defining (as has
Turiel, 1977) certain classes of behavior, such as helping others in distress, as
arbitrarily relevant t o morality, whereas other classes, such as not handling a
forbidden toy, are not morally relevant.
For the purpose of this paper, a moral situation is defined as one that evokes
significant guilt or shame when transgression occurs; normally, this will mean
that a significant transgression of one's values has occurred or may occur. Moral
self-control, on the other hand, will be defined as behavior where one resists
temptation in a moral situation in spite of the perception that detection of
transgression is not possible. One test of whether any situation is a moral one
would be t o determine whether the rate or frequency of moral behavior changed
(appropriately) as moral values were made increasingly salient; the first section
of this chapter addresses that issue. Asecond test of whether morality is perceived
as relevant to a situation would be achieved by manipulating emotional arousal
or attributions about arousal to ascertain whether moral behavior increased or
decreased; the second and larger half of this chapter presents research using such
techniques.
Whether an individual responds to a situation as a moral dilemma depends
primarily upon the cultural, social, and individual context, for categories of behavior defined as morally relevant by one culture, society, or by one individual
may not be similarly defined by others. Within the culture of "middle America,"
for example, situations involving theft, or others being hurt, may be perceived
by most people as clearly calling for moral decisions, whereas less consensus as
to moral relevance would exist for some other issues (e.g., sexuality or "hard
work"). But even for a single individualit is likely that the temptation to perform
a specific behavior in one situation might be considered a moral dilemma, whereas in another situation that same behavior would not be regarded as morally
relevant. Consider the following example: A college student with the need and
opportunity to cheat attributes the quality of unfairness to the test and the
testing context. In that example, attributing the quality of "unfairness" might
reduce the perception of moral relevance for the act of cheating, resulting in
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increased cheating. It should be apparent that a great variety of situational
attributes could potentially affect the degree to w h c h moral values and constructs are perceived to be relevant to the choices in a given situation. Such
attributions about the meaning of each situation will undoubtedly affect the
attributions about the nature and meaning of any emotional arousal experienced;
attributions of both types will then influence the individual's behavior.
A series of studies are presented t o illustrate the point that specific attributions made about temptation situations (rather than a specific behavior) determine
whether an individual will respond to a temptation situation as a moral dilemma.
Specifically, the research demonstrates the importance of attributes about the
victim of cheating in making moral values relevant or irrelevant to cheating. The
logic of the research is simple: If making moral values or norms salient for research
subjects increases their tendency to cheat on an exam, then the act of cheating
is not being perceived as morally wrong; on the other hand, if cheating decreases
when morality is made salient - compared to a control group for whom morality
is not made salient - the dilemma of whether or not to cheat is indeed a moral
one. Besides being based on common sense, this approach is based on the research
of Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1976), who demonstrated increased
helping behavior after altruistic values were made salient. Schwartz used the
term norm activation to suggest that the norms governing altruistic behavior
were already well internalized but were potentiated or activated by a technique
that reminded subjects of those norms. In this paper, I shall continue to use the
term value to mean norms that have been "internalized."
In the first study of the five-study series (Dienstbier, Kahle, Willis, & Tunnell,
1977) done with the able assistance of Gil Tunnell, we initially attempted to
explore aspects of emotion attribution theory that will be discussed in a later
section of this chapter. However, the study led us down a theoretical path not
initially intended. Freshmen male college students were recruited for a study on
verbal skills and were subjected to a series of tests beginning with a vocabulary
test; that test was followed by a reading comprehension test (the independent
manipulation) and then with the opportunity to cheat (the dependent measure)
on the vocabulary test. Three different versions of the reading comprehension
test concerning the Minoan culture were constructed: The first versions described
their high moral principles based upon personal values and guilt (the internal
manipulation). The second version presented similarly high moral principles
based upon social norms and shame (the external manipulation). The third version dealt with the high level of achievement of the Minoans (the control manipulation). As confirmed by an elaborate postexperimental questionnaire (such as
used in all the reported studies), the later cheating situation was perceived by
the subjects as free from possible detection. It was hypothesized that the moral
values that were made salient would be effective in reducing cheating on the
vocabulary test for the two groups of subjects who read about moral principles,

in contrast to the (higher) cheating frequency of control subjects. [The reading
comprehension passages were based upon an article by Davies (1969) on the
achievements of the Minoans.]
In order to induce motivation t o cheat on the vocabulary portion of the test,
the subjects were told that typical college freshmen scored at least 18 right on
the 30-item, multiple-choice test and that their performance on the test would
be compared with their future college performance, since the "Board of Psychologists" developing the test thought that vocabularly scores would correspond
with grades in certain courses. Subjects were seated in a row of booths so that
the 6 to 10 subjects present for any one session could not see each other; cheating
occurred as answer changing during a "delay" period after the test was over
when the answers were available. Since subjects were told that the machinegradable answer paper for the vocabularly items must be marked darkly and be
free of sloppy erasures, they had an excuse to use pencils during the "delay"
period. However, they were warned (as in all the cheating research) not to change
any answers. [The procedure for detecting cheating using pressure-sensitive
paper is described in detail elsewhere (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971).] The results
were clearly contrary to the hypothesis; the control-condition subjects cheated
less (21% of the 48 subjects cheated) than subjects in the other two conditions
(33% of the 43 internal-condition subjects cheated, and 43% of the 44 external
subjects cheated). In other words, the activation of moral values by the internal
and external reading comprehension passages increased rather than prevented
cheating - a totally unexpected finding. An informal statistical analysis (Fisher
Exact Test, two-tailed) was undertaken, indicating a significance level of p =
.06 between the control condition cheating rate and the combined rate for the
internal and external conditions. It was not until after that effect was replicated
with diverse procedures and materials that the finding was regarded as credible.
Since the results in that initial research were contrary to expectations, a second
study was undertaken with different materials, again in an effort to study
differences between cheating rates of the internal vs. external subjects, and with
the control condition included merely for additional information. That study,
done with the aid of Keith Willis, was carried out with freshmen female subjects
and vastly revised independent manipulation ("readingcomprehension")materials,
though the vocabularly testing part and the cheating opportunity remained
essentially the same as for Study 1. Subjects were told that since they all had
similar psychology backgrounds (being all in their first basic course), the reading
comprehension test would deal with psychology topics (giving no one an unfair
advantage). After reading and being tested on a passage on the sensation of
touch, the independent manipulation passage was read. Internal- and externalcondition subjects read about the development of conscience. The external
passage indicated that the final developmental step was completed when the
individual experienced shame when detection for transgression was thought
to be possible. The internal passage concluded that conscience was developed
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when guilt was experienced even when detection was impossible. Control subjects read about the development of immediate memory. A replication of the
results of Study 1 was achieved, with almost identical cheating rates in the
internal and external conditions (32% of the 56 subjects in both conditions
cheating) and with that rate considerably higher than that for the control subjects (14% of the 29 subjects cheating, p = .05, Fisher's exact test, one-tailed).
With the unexpected results of both Studies 1 and 2, where increased cheating
followed the activation of moral values, a more thoughtful analysis was undertaken of the situation as it was perceived by the subjects. In Studies 1 and 2,
following procedures developed for other research (Dienstbier & Munter, 1971;
Dienstbier, 1972), subjects had been told that the vocabularly test was an experimental test being developed by a board of psychologists, and they were
asked to put their social security number of their answer sheet, "just in case the
board developing this test decides t o compare your vocabularly test performance
with your later grades in certain courses - so far they have found that most
successful college students score at least 18, as freshmen, on this 30-item test;
a chance score is 10."
I began to suspect that the subjects perceived the research as basically unfair
and that this unfairness could be offset by their cheating on the vocabulary test
to achieve a score somewhat higher (and closer t o 18) than they had achieved
fairly. Furthermore, cheating against an anonymous "board of psychologists"
might have seemed too impersonal a jesture t o be morally relevant. Certainly
similar logic is often used by individuals dealing with large institutions such as
their government at tax time, insurance companies, etc. More cheating after
moral value activation could be due t o the subjects being able to make a clearer
definition of morality following the reading of the conscience-oriented passages,
so that their present situation could be more clearly defined as nonmoral. To
test this notion, a third study was undertaken with materials and procedures
identical to those used in Study 2, except that Keith Willis, who had acted as the
experimenter in Study 2, remade our tape-recorded instructions in his voice and
claimed that this research was for his Ph.D. dissertation. References t o the "board
of psychologists" were changed to "I" in the instructions pertaining to the
vocabulary test, and subjects were told: "Don't change any answers. I really
need accurate data for my thesis, or I'll have to spend another semester trying."
It was believed that those changes would cause subjects to redefine the situation
as a moral one, with cheating an immoral behavior, so that moral value activation
via the initial reading comprehension passages would result in reduced cheating.
That prediction was realized with 12% of the 69 subjects in the two experimental
groups cheating, compared with 29% of the 34 control-condition subjects (p =
.03, Fisher's exact test, two-tailed). The difference in cheating patterns between
Studies 2 and 3, run in successive semesters but with the same experimenter and
format except as described above, was statistically significant (p < .005 using
an interaction test for arc-sine transformed percentages, two-tailed, developed by

Langer and Abelson, 1972). The results of Study 3 were essentially replicated in
a study to be reported below.
To buttress our confidence that the complete reversal in cheating pattern between Studies 2 and 3 was really due to the perception that cheating in Study 3
was perceived to be morally wrong, especially after reading about morality, I
conducted a fourth study with Lynn Kahle. In Study 4, subjects participated in
either the Study 2 or the Study 3 version of the procedure, except that when the
opportunity t o cheat occurred, we asked subjects to record their level of resentment toward either the "board of psychologists who developed the vocabulary
test" in the Study 2 version or toward "Lynn Kahle who developed the vocabulary test" in the Study 3 version. Subjects were given the opportunity to respond
on a 5-point scale with possible answers from "none" (scored 1) to "extreme"
(scored 5). Those subjects in Study 2 (with the board of psychologists) were
significantly more resentful than subjects in the Study 3 version (means of
1.98 vs. 1.43, F = 7.08, p < .01). Furthermore, as predicted, whereas subjects
in the internal and external conditions of Study 2 were considerably more resentful than subjects in the comparable conditions of Study 3 (means of 2.13 vs.
1.47, t = 2.77, p < .01, two-tailed), resentfulness of control-condition subjects
did not differ significantly between the studies (mean of 1.67 vs. 1.35, t = .89,
NS). The pattern of data therefore supports the contention that although subjects resented the "board of psychologists" considerably more than the graduatestudent researcher, their resentment was accentuated by the reading of the
morally relevant reading comprehension materials.
The research presented above (along with a similar study presented below to
explore other emotion-attribution issues) demonstrates that specific attributions
that people make about potential moral dilemmas determine whether moral
values (and by inference, avoidance-mediating emotions such as guilt and shame)
are relevant t o one's behavioral choices. Making morality salient in the research
above either increased or decreased the number of subjects who saw the situation
as morally relevant and who resisted the temptation to cheat.
Unfortunately, this research does not provide an easy key to the analysis
of what situations will be perceived as moral ones for people in the real world
or for research subjects in other settings. Instead, I am able to suggest only a
research technique. When the researcher assumes that individuals will bring to
bear certain values or constructs in response to the research situation, one
method for checking that assumption is to preactivate those values or constructs
to determine whether appropriate behavior is stimulated.
In the following section, in contrast, the manipulations were not relevant to
the activation of moral values, so that we may assume that the subjects in the
various research conditions were equally likely to perceive the moral implications of their behavior (often cheating) and were equally motivated to cheat.
The issue of the following section and of the research described in it is how the
quantity and quality of emotional arousal and experience affected moral selfcontrol.
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EMOTIONAL AROUSAL AND MORAL BEHAVIOR

The larger half of this chapter will deal with those emotion attribution processes
that occur when an individual faces temptation to transgress against moral values.
The first issue, addressed through the research reviewed immediately below, is
whether the avoidance of behavior that has potentially painful (physically or
psychologically) consequences is facilitated by heightened emotional arousal.
Studies by Lykken (1957) and by Schachter and Latane' (1964) demonstrated
that psychopathic criminals, who are often described as without fear or guilt,
failed to avoid errors punished with shock in a lever-maze learning situation.
(At each "choice point" in the "maze" there was a correct response, an incorrect
and shocked error, and several possible wrong options not resulting in shock.)
The demonstration by Schachter and Latand that psychopaths would learn t o
avoid shocked errors when pre-aroused with an adrenalin injection (contrasted
with a placebo injection) provided significant evidence for the conclusion that
nonaroused psychopaths disregarded the shock because of a lack of normal
emotional response to that punishment. Other work by Schachter and Ono
(Schachter & Latane', 1964) demonstrated that college students would cheat
more under tranquilizer (chlorpromazine) conditions than under placebo conditions. Those findings gave considerable support to the traditional view that
avoidance behavior (including the avoidance of behavior seen as immoral) is
mediated, or at least facilitated, by emotional arousal. It is only a short conceptual step to the normally accepted idea that moral transgressions are resisted
in part through the aid of conditioned fear, anxiety, shame, and guilt, an analysis
akin t o the two-factor avoidance theory advanced by Mowrer (1950). The twofactor avoidance theory states that avoidance is facilitated by conditioned emotional responses that increase as the individual approaches the forbidden behavior
and decrease (providing reinforcement) as the individual avoids or retreats from
that behavior. That theory provides our starting point.

EMOTION ATTRIBUTION AND MORAL BEHAVIOR

Schachter and Singer (1962) demonstrated that emotional arousal artificially
induced by adrenalin injection could be experienced as different emotional
states (anger or euphoria), depending on the different attributions made in different experimental contexts. The application of that idea to our avoidance
formulation, as developed above, would lead to a theoretical elaboration. Identical
levels of emotional arousal, resulting from a conditioned emotional response t o
(planned) transgression behavior, might lead to very different reactions depending
upon the attributions made about the causes or meaning of that emotional
response. Actually, this statement represents little more than the imposition of
attribution-theory language on an idea occasionally articulated by socialization
theorists. In the words of punishment researchers Walters and Parke (1967), it

may be that "social conformity is not facilitated by arousal per se but only by
emotional responses that are associated with, or are contingent on, certain kinds
of cognitive structuring [p. 2201 ." The first study in the next series of research
was an attempt t o ascertain whether the attributions an individual made about
emotional arousal naturally induced in a temptation situation could be manipulated to alter the frequency of tempted behavior substantially. Since other research
had clearly demonstrated that the quantity of arousal was important in avoiding
punished errors and temptation, this initial research posed the question ofwhether
qualitative differences in emotional states under constant arousal conditions
would yield similar results. This question, if answered affirmatively, would
prove far from academic, for it could provide one of the keys t o understanding
how cognition plays a role in modulating the impact of emotional inhibition
without immediately changing the quantity of emotional arousal. In nonmoral
contexts, we are used to viewing such emotional-cognitive interactions. Even
if we are slightly acrophobic, for example, we know that if we can retain our
belief that a roller coaster ride is safe, and if the emotional arousal is not overwhelming, we may experience the arousal state as positive excitement rather
than negative fear. In our attribution language system, we would say that the
attribution of the cause of the emotional experience to the speed and fast stimulation changes rather than to danger allows the emotional arousal to be experienced
as noninhibitory; we continue to seek out rather than to avoid the roller coaster.
In the first study of this series, done with the aid of Pamela Osborne Munter
(Diestbier & Munter, 1971), I attempted to study the impact of different emotion attributions on cheating. Recruited for a study on the impact of a vitamin
supplement on vision, subjects ingested a placebo pill and participated in a
vocabulary testing exercise like that described previously, while waiting for the
pill (supposedly containing the vitamin supplement) to take effect. The vocabulary
test was introduced as a delay task, but subjects were told that the board of psychologists would probably get in contact with them if they scored less than 20.
Subjects were then exposed to the autokinetic illusion to verify that the pill
really did have psychoactive effects and were subsequently given an opportunity
to cheat on their vocabulary test, although they were warned (as in all cheating
research), "Do not change any answers." At the beginning of the study and
immediately prior to the opportunity to cheat, half of the subjects were told to
anticipate possible side effects of autonomic arousal (e.g., heart acceleration,
face flushing, etc.), and half were told to expect benign side effects irrelevant to
autonomic arousal.
In that study 49% of the 47 subjects who had anticipated arousal side effects
cheated, compared to 27% of the 4 8 control (nonarousal) subjects (p < .05,
by Fisher's exact text, one-tailed). But the entire effect was due to the male
subjects. Follow-up research (Dienstbier, 1972) indicated that the effect held for
women, too, provided that the threat for failure was made less intense; it was
concluded that either the women experienced the threat of Study 1 as more
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attention-preoccupying than did the male subjects, so that they did not attend
to the more subtle aspects of the study pertaining to the pill side effects, or that
they were unable to attribute their higher emotional arousal to the pill. The
hypothesis underlying those studies on cheating was confirmed, with those subjects who could attribute their emotional arousal to the placebo pill apparently
experiencing their arousal differently, so that it did not play an inhibitory role
as they considered cheating.
Of course there are alternative explanations of this type finding - explanations that do not assume that the vital process is the attribution of arousal to
the pill. For example, there is a possibility that merely inducing the subject t o
attend to the arousal side effects might somehow cause the associated emotion
to become reduced or dissociated from the temptation dilemma. In a second
study discussed in the 1972 article, that question was experimentally addressed.
In a four-condition study, half the subjects received n o placebo but were told
that they were in a "control" condition. It was explained to those "control"
subjects that after the "real" subjects received the vitamin-related drug, we
assess drug effects through a side effects checklist that those "real" subjects
fill out. Therefore, it was explained, the possibility exists that suggestions induced by the questions on the checklist might result in the side effects being
reported by the "real" subjects when they really are not experienced. To ascertain
whether this checklist suggestion effect was real, "control" subjects were told
that they would be run through exactly the same study as the "real" subjects,
except that they would receive no pill. This is exactly what was done. Half of the
"control" subjects were given drug information and a checklist concerning the
arousal side effects, while the second half received the benign side effects description and checklist. "Control" subjects were asked to "look into themselves
conscientiously, just as 'real' subjects did," to assess whether they experienced
the symptoms listed on their side effects lists. The other two conditions of the
study received the "arousal" and "benign" placebo pills in conditions that
essentially replicated the Dienstbier and Munter (1971) study. In the "control"
conditions, merely attending to arousal side effects did not facilitate cheating,
but the facilitory effect of the arousal placebo in the replication conditions was
observed. The statistically significant interaction helped to establish that the
hypothesized emotion-attribution process may be the best logical explanation
for the increased cheating with the arousal placebo.
The success of the studies described above led to interest in working with the
attributional processes that would be employed by children as they faced temptation. I speculated that those attribution processes would be shaped by the
socialization practices of the parents, since different socialization techniques
would provide different emotion-attribution information. For example, if physical
punishment followed stealing, would the punishment itself become so salient
and obvious a source of the child's emotional discomfort that the child would
attribute emotional discomfort to the punishment rather than to the stealing?

If so, in future temptation (to steal) situations, would the conditioned emotional
response be attributed to the punishment rather than to the act of stealing? If,
in the former case, the emotion was experienced as fear of punishment, would
the emotion be as effective in preventing stealing than if equally intense emotions
in anticipation of stealing were attributed to the act of theft itself'? It was
hypothesized that the externally attributed emotional discomfort (to the punishment rather than to the act) would be less effective in inhibiting transgression
when the situation was perceived as detection-free. That formulation is untestable
for ethical reasons; but the hypothesized ineffectiveness of external emotion
attributions is testable if external attributions are induced through verbal rather
than physical techniques.
Studies of Self-Control with Children
The research that was subsequently undertaken t o explore those questions was
therefore restricted by practical and ethical considerations to testing whether
children would react differently in a detection-free situation after they had
been given the attributions that previous emotional discomfort (from a failure
in a similar situation) was due t o being "found out for doing the wrong thing"
(external) as compared to attributing their emotional arousal simply to "having
done the wrong thing" (internal). If merely giving different verbal attribution
information in an experimental context substantially altered subsequent behavior
in a "detection-free" situation, evidence would be provided to support the conclusion that like the college freshmen in the cheating studies, the emotional
attributions childrenmake are relevant to moral behavior and extremely susceptible
to influence; hence such processes could be an important key to understanding
socialization differences.
In the placebo research with adults, emotion attributions were manipualted
in a manner quite dissimilar from real-life experiences. This use of techniques
not encountered outside of the laboratory was undertaken in order to establish
that attribution manipulations could induce differential cheating. The shift to
research with children, however, represented an examination of emotion-attribution at quite a different level from that in the placebo-cheating research with
adults, for the emotion attributions that were induced with children are closer
to potential real-life manipulations.
In the first two studies (Dienstbier, Hillman, Lehnhoff, Hillman, & Valkenaar,
1975) of the series with second-grade children, a three-part procedure was developed in which different children were first asked to watch a slot car that
supposedly had a problem. After their failure at that watching task was dicovered
by the experimenter, their emotional responses were attributed to being found
out (external) or to having done the wrong thing (internal). The children were
subsequently left alone, watching the car for a period of 12 minutes with their
attention to the task timed after the situation was changed so that they believed
that they could not again be detected for not watching the slot car. Since this
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procedure is presented in detail elsewhere (Dienstbier et al., 1975), it will be
presented here but briefly and only the results from the second of the first two
studies will be considered.
In Study 2 of the research with children, second-grade identical and same-sex
fraternal twins were used as subjects, with one of each twin pair in each of the
two experimental conditions; Steve Slane and Gail Zimmerman worked diligently
with me in Study 2. The subject population was chosen since environmental
and genetic differences (and hence error variance) are nearly equated between
conditions, permitting a sensitive matched-pairs analysis of the results; differences
between the means of the two experimental conditions would not be altered by
this choice of subjects, however.
In the first phase of Study 2, the randomly chosen participating twin was told
that the slot car he was to watch was very old and that it might break if it fell
off the track. It was explained to each twin that recent problems with the slot
cars included the cars occasionally going too fast so that they jumped the track
but that when that was about to happen a "trouble light" on the side of the
"control" (observation) booth would go on. The child was then to push in the
level indicated on the side of the booth to prevent the "accident." It was explained
that the man who fixed the toys would soon be called by the experimenter but
that he could not fix the slot car track unless it was well "warmed up." The
child was then asked to help by watching the slot car run on the track during the
experimenter's absence to "call the toy man"; the experimenter then left the
room. Immediately following the child's transgression to the set criterion (not
watching for 6 continuous seconds), the slot car was made to jump the track and
the "trouble light" was turned on; the slot cars were controlled by an observer
hidden in a one-way observation booth in the toy room. The experimenter,
having been signaled by the observer, returned immediately after the slot car
accident and accompanied the child to another room (allowing the observer to
remain blind). The experimenter then became aware of the first twin's condition
and delivered the independent manipulation. Except for the attribution message
itself, the language and emphasis of the two manipulation scripts was identical.
The excerpt below is a brief portion of the external manipulation script with the
italicized parts indicating the phrases added t o modify the internal script to external:
"I bet you feel a little bad now that I found out the car fell off. I've seen
other kids feel bad when someone found out they weren't able to do exactly
what they were supposed to do. When the other kids who tried to watch the car
couldn't, they felt bad when Ifound out too," etc.
At the end of the independent manipulation, delivered in a gentle and warm
manner, the child and experimenter returned to the toy room. The child was
told that since he/she knew how to start and control the new "unbreakable"
slot car, that during the ensuing period with the experimenter locked out (and
with no key), "even if it (the slot car) did fly off the track, I'd never find out,

since you could put it back yourself and I can't come right in with the door
locked." After establishing a "secret knock" so that the child would know when
the experimenter had returned, the child was left "alone" in the locked (from
the outside) room for 12 minutes of slot-car watching. At the end of the 12minute period, all children were praised lavishly for their apparently excellent
performance and exchanged with their opposite-condition co-twin.
The average time of transgression (not watching the slot car) was 322 seconds
for the external-condition twins, compared to 177 seconds for the internal condition children ( t = 8.0, p < .001). Aside from the mean superiority of the
watching behavior of the internal twins, a remarkable data pattern emerged; for
each of the six twin-pairs run, the external twin transgressed approximately twice
as much as the internal twin, a finding not dependent upon which condition was
run first.
An analysis of the procedure from the child's standpoint may be useful in
putting the powerful data of Study 2 in perspective. First, when the first slot car
jumped the track, followed almost immediately by the entrance of the experimenter, the suddenness of all that happened seemed to leave most children quite
surprised; most subjects displayed emotional arousal as evidenced by agitation
and attempts to remedy the situation and/or to provide excuses for the accident.
Second, although the experimenter acted warmly and kindly toward the child,
he was a male (hence less often encountered in this type of situation by secondgrade children), and he was a relative stranger (hence somewhat unpredictable
and arousal provoking). In response to some combination of those factors and
the experimenter's warm delivery of the independent manipulation, most children
responded quite positively by apparently trying to pay attention. Finally, the
task was a new one, with which the children had not had extensive previous
experience, so that they were (presumably) somewhat more suggestible than if
a more mundane task had been used. Since most factors, as described above,
differ from typical socialization situations in the home or school, with the differences favoring more potential impact for our manipulation, it should not be
expected that a similar level of single-trial success would be achieved with similar
attribution manipulations in natural settings.
Although most early moral training is undertaken by socialization agents in
circumstances of the child's heightened arousal following transgression (as in
Study 2), I was curious if similar results could be achieved in an "innoculation"
paradigm - a situation of reduced emotional arousal with emotion-attribution
information given prior to any transgression or error. As the idea developed of
exploring emotion-attribution procedures under conditions of reduced emotional
arousal, the question of whether the arousal concept was necessary at all was
confronted. An analogy t o perceptual-motor functioning seems appropriate. In
perceptual-motor tasks, when a skill such as driving a car is well learned, we take
account of and respond t o extremely small variations in directions, guiding the
vehicle accordingly but usually without an awareness that is consciously articu-
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lated. It may be that we similarly learn to take account of even slight variations
in autonomic arousal levels, responding and "correcting course" with (often)
minimal or no articulated awareness. This belief in the influence of even slight
arousal was clearly anticipated by William James (1890): "The changes are so
indenfinitely numerous and subtle that the entire organism may be called a
sounding-board which every change of consciousness, however slight, may make
reverberate. . . . Every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt acutely
or obscurely, the moment it occurs [p. 4501 ." Although these observations d o
not conclusively establish the necessity of the arousal concept, they do encourage
the continued use of the concept, especially in light of the earlier cited research.
That is, it is apparent that most research subjects did not undergo strong arousal
in the studies of Schachter and Ono (in Schachter & Latani, 1964) and those
previously cited cheating studies with adults by my associates and me; yet the
subjects responded to a tranquilizer in Schachter's research and emotion-attribution information about the (placebo) pill in our research as if their emotional
arousal were quite significant.
The third study in this series with children, undertaken with the aid of Gil
Tunnel1 and Cynthia Gallentine, was conducted to ascertain whether the emotionattribution procedure would yield similar results under conditions of reduced
emotional arousal and when given prior to any temptation or failure.
Data were gathered from 10 pairs of same-sex fraternal and identical twins,
2 pairs of which were in first grade, with the remaining 8 in second grade. As in
Study 2, the randomly chosen participating twin was instructed in the necessity
of running the slot car t o warm it up and on the procedures for preventing a
slot-car accident.
But we eliminated any personal failure experience and attempted to minimize
the emotional arousal of our subjects by telling them about a child who helped
the toy room experimenter "yesterday" who did not do a good job watching;
the slot car therefore jumped the track. Together the experimenter and child
discovered the slot car to be broken - a result that supposedly could only happen
to such a "very old" slot car.
The experimenter and the child then left the toy room (to aid in keeping the
observer blind) to find a "new" slot car that the child would watch. During that
absence the experimenter became aware of the (first) twin's condition and
administered the independent manipulation, which was similar to that used in
Study 2. The external passage below, representing the first two sentences of the
independent manipulation, has the phrases italicized that represent those added
to change the internal script to the external version:
"When the car fell off before, yesterday, when that other kid was supposed
to be watching it, he felt very bad when I found out. I know he did, because he
told me how bad he felt that Ifound out the car fell off."
Upon returning to the toy room, the child was told that although this new
slot car could not break if it flew off the track, it would be bad for it t o jump

the track many times; constant attention to the car and trouble light would
therefore be required to prevent accidents. The locked toy room door and
secret knock portions were similar to Study 2. To make sure that subjects understood that their conduct was free from detection, they were told: "Remember,
this is a new car and so it won't break even if it does fly off, and you know how
to put it on and how to start it up. And the door will be locked so I can't come
right in. So even if it did fly off the track, I'd never know." The experimenter
then left the room, remaining out for 12 minutes, during which the child's
attention to the constantly running slot car was monitored by the hidden
observer.
Mean seconds transgressing (not watching) for the internal-condition twins
were 188, compared with 346 seconds for the external-condition co-twins
(t = 2.54, sig < .02, one-tailed).
Although Study 3 demonstrated that an inoculation procedure under apparently
lower arousal levels could be similar in power t o the Study 2, procedure utilizing
prior failure, an even more convincing demonstration would be effected if children
could be induced to make internal (vs. external) attributions through the use of
materials not directly relevant to the dependent measure task. That is, one
problem for the unambiguous interpretation of these studies with children is
that it is possible that the internal manipulations drew more attention to the
dependent measure task, or somehow made that task seem more important, etc.
Subsequent research with children was designed to answer the question of
whether stories with internal or external emotion-attribution themes would
differentially effect behavior in a difficult ("detection-free") watching task that
would be presented to the children as unrelated other research. Although the
initial research, conducted with the aid of Arleen Lewis, Charles Kaplan, Max
Lewis, and Keith Willis, was successful in demonstrating superior watching
performance from second-grade children after listening to internally oriented
stories (heroes feeling good or bad due to their own performance, contrasted t o
external stories with feelings dependent upon others knowing), subsequent studies
in our lab failed to replicate that effect; and I feel no confidence in our initial
positive findings.
The positive outcome of such studies would have relevance beyond that of
allowing greater certainty in the interpretation of the research with children. If
it could be demonstrated that general internal emotion-attribution information
given in a nonarousing context can be applied by individuals in specific moral
situations, then the potential for developing moral training curriculae based
upon this potentially powerful technique would be established.
Fortunately, research with college-age adult subjects has been successful in
demonstrating this effect. The first series of research reported in this chapter
(Dienstbier et al., 1977) utilized "reading comprehension test" materials to
induce subjects to accept either internally or externally oriented emotionattribution beliefs about the functioning of conscience. But differences between
those two manipulations were not found in the three studies reported; the only
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differences that consistently emerged were between the passages relating to
morality (both internal and external) and the control condition material (dealing,
in Studies 2 and 3, with memory). Fortunately for understanding the problems
of Studies 2 and 3, a manipulation check question was included in the test
questions; the question asked experimental condition subjects t o indicate what
the "final step" was in the development of morality. One of the two possible
answers was externally oriented toward parental punishment, whereas the other
was internally oriented toward one's own moral principles. The question was
answered correctly by only 62% of the subjects in Study 3. Since chance alone
would yield a base rate of 50% correct, it was apparent that differences between
the internal and external conditions were only weakly established, with approximately 24% of the subjects knowing the right answer (and half of the remaining
76% of the subjects guessing the correct option, yielding the 62% correct figure).
To strengthen the internal vs. external manipualtion in Study 5 , those passages
were completely rewritten. In all other critical ways, Study 5 was identical to
Study 3, being supposedly the thesis research of the graduate student assistant;
this study was conducted with the able assistance of Lynn Kahle. It was predicted
that with the distinction between the internal and external emotion-attribution
passages much better defined, the external condition and control condition
cheating rates would be closer, with the internal condition cheating rate being
significantly less than the other two.
Freshmen women subjects were recruited exactly as in Studies 2 and 3 to
participate in a study "involving verbal testing." Those subjects who read the
one-page, internally oriented passage on "The Development of Moral SelfControl" read that
Even if the child has never been scolded or punished by parents, the child
may begin to experience emotional tension when considering the violation
of moral rules about things such as lying, cheating, or stealing. . . the individual will resist temptation t o avoid the emotional tension even though
n o one else may ever know of the transgression . . . as we mature, the
pleasure which we anticipate from knowing that we have acted morally
correct remains a strong motivating force in helping us to be strong in the
face of temptation. . . . Research has demonstrated that often very strong
feelings of emotional tension result from individuals violating their own
moral values, even though other people important to them do not know of
those violations.
Comparable passages from the externally oriented passage were as follows:
After being scolded or punished a number of times by parents or others,
the child begins to experience emotional tension when considering the
possibility of being found violating the moral rules about things such as
lying, cheating, or stealing. . . the individual will resist temptation to avoid
the emotional tension which is tied to the risk of being found out . . . as we
mature, the pleasure which we anticipate from others knowing that we

have acted morally correct remains a strong motivating force in helping us
to be strong in the face of temptation . . . research has demonstrated that
often very strong feelings of emotional tension result when other people
who are important t o us discover and confront us over violations of moral
values.
In addition to the differences in the internally and externally oriented passages
as sampled above, at the end of each of the passages a "study question" was
added to further involve the subject in thinking about morality in the manner
described in each passage. Subjects were told that if they thought carefully about
the passage and the question it would help them in the later reading-comprehension questions. Internal condition subjects were asked, "Can you think of any
time recently when you were confronted with a moral choice but resisted transgression and remained strong due to feelings of emotional tension associated
with your knowledge that the transgression violated your own moral values?"
External subjects read a similar question ending with ". . . due to feelings of
emotional tension associated with you knowing that other people might find out
that you had transgressed?"
As in the previous studies of this type, after answering the first set of readingcomprehension questions, the subjects were given the right answers to the
vocabulary test during the "delay" period and an excuse to use their pencils.
As in Study 3, they were told that in order to avoid having to work an extra
semester on his doctoral dissertation research, the researcher needed accurate
data, etc.
The manipulation check indicated that a much better distinction between
the independent manipulation passages concerning morality was achieved, with
83% of the subjects choosing correctly the internally or externally oriented
option t o the manipulation check question following the delay period, indicating
that 66% knew the correct answer. As always, suspicious subjects were eliminated
via a detailed, funnel-type (Page, 1971), postexperimental questionnaire.
As predicted, whereas only 15% of the 66 internal-condition subjects cheated,
30% of the 66 external subjects and 31% of the 61 control-condition subjects
cheated. By chi-square tests, the frequency of cheating in the internal condition
is significantly different from that of the external condition (chi-square = 4.3 1,
p < .05) and significantly different from the control condition (chi-square
= 4 . 6 0 , ~< .05).'
'1t is of some interest to note, because social psychology is currently involved in discussions of the impact of social psychological knowledge on social change, that the independent
manipulation in this study consisted of passages discussing two psychological theories, each
having some claim to validity. That is, the external passage was essentially a presentation of
the two-factor theory of avoidance (avoiding temptation to avoid previously conditioned
emotion responses), whereas the internal manipulation was essentially the theory of selfcontrol presented in this paper and previously by Dienstbier et al. (1975). Differential
cheating rates were achieved, then, by reading two different current psychological theories.
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RESEARCH SUMMARY AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES
It is useful now to consider the implications of all the emotion-attribution research
reviewed so far for the purposes of summary and in order to explore that research
for general conclusions not obvious when viewed piecemeal. The initial research
with college students was presented to establish the importance of emotionattributions in making moral decisions, using a placebo pill manipulation that
had very little apparent mundane or real-world realism. On the other hand, the
research with conceptually similar phenomena with children presented manipulations that had far more mundane realism, such that it would not be difficult
to speculate productivity about direct applications of that research t o real-life
socialization problems. But in changing significantly both the age of subjects
and the form of the manipulation between the initial adult and the subsequent
child research, we had only the theoretical bridge of emotion-attribution theory
to join those two quite different research series. The final study presented above,
using the reading comprehension approach to independent variable manipulation,
substantially reinforces that conceptual bridge, for the manipulation content
(e.g., "the individual will resist temptation to avoid the emotional tension even
though no one else may ever know of the transgression") was purposefully
designed to resemble that of the research with children (e.g., "He told me he
would have felt bad even if I didn't find out"). The major value of that study,
however, is the finding that adults were able t o apply that general emotionattribution information about morality to a specific cheating situation. Although
that finding would be more useful if it could have been demonstrated with
young children as well, it is likely that our failure to demonstrate such a generalto-specific transition with children was due to working with children who were
too young (second grade).
Another theme emerges from the research program as a whole other than the
apparent convergence of support for the emotion-attribution analysis. It does
appear that children and young adults alike are remarkably susceptible to
external influences in the attributions they make about the causes and meanings
of their emotional arousal.
How Attributional Processes Affect Behavior
There are apparently three ways in which the attribution of emotion to an irrelevant source may affect the impact of that emotional arousal on subsequent behavior. Any or all of these effects may influence the role of emotional arousal
in resistance to temptation.
The major emphasis derived largely from the research presented above has
been that emotional arousal attributed to an irrelevant source simply becomes
less effective in influencing behavior than if the source of the emotional arousal
is experienced as relevant. For example, one may make attributions, which are
essentially cognitive, that an emotional response is due to acrophobia on a high

bridge or due to fear of detection in obviously safe situations. Although the
quality of the emotional experience may change little or not at all under such
circumstances, if the emotional arousal is of low or moderate intensity, it may
be relatively easy and logically consistent to override the avoidance tendency
motivated by the emotional state. This response somewhat resembles the classical
psychoanalytic defense of "denial," but it should be increasingly more difficult
to accomplish with increasing levels of negative emotion. The ineffectiveness of
the arousal (placebo) pill manipulation with women in the initial emotionattribution study discussed previously was probably due in part to this phenomenon of increased difficulty in acting against the emotion when the emotion is
intense. Similarly, Nisbett and Schachter (1966) found that under high-fear
conditions, subjects would not attribute shock-induced arousal to a placebo
pill with "arousal" properties, though such an effective attribution to the placebo
(allowing more shock tolerance) under low-fear conditions did occur.
The second way in which the attribution of emotion to "irrelevant" sources
may attenuate the impact of that emotion is through the quality of the emotion
changing as a result of that reattribution. This result is probably more likely
when a mixture of situational cues is present, some of which make positive and
some negative emotions relevant. As suggested in the example used early in this
chapter, the roller coaster may prove very exciting, even to the mildly acrophobic
rider, if positive cues (other people laughing, the fast motion, etc.) are present
and if the negative emotional state is perceived t o be due to irrelevant sources
(e.g., the rider perceives the danger as nonexistent, so the fear is due to personal
and irrelevant deficiencies). Which of the cues are responded to will depend in
part upon the chronic dispositions and needs of the individual. For example, the
intense need for excitement believed to be common to the psychopath (Hare,
1970) may dispose such an individual t o regard cues associated with negative
emotional states (objective danger, etc.) as irrelevant (Yochelson & Samenow,
1976). If negative cues are suddenly perceived as relevant, however, the positive
emotional state may quickly revert to a negative experience. This re-experiencing
of a different emotional state due to focusing upon selective cues has been termed
"drive displacement" by Epstein (1967), who noted that novice skydivers often
experience outbursts of anger prior to jumping, while steadfastly denying the
experience of fear. Perhaps Frued observed these processes in developing the
"reaction-formation" concept.
Finally, there is evidence that if the source of emotional arousal is seen as
irrelevant, the emotional response will extinguish more quickly than if the emotion is seen as situationally appropriate. Loftis and Ross (1974) demonstrated
that an emotional response would extinguish more quickly with continued
presentation of the conditioned stimulus if subjects believed that the response
was not due t o the presented stimulus. This phenomenon is also quite likely to be
observed mainly at low emotional arousal levels, for case histories are numberous
of phobic individuals failing to experience extinction of their emotional reactions to stimuli that they knew (cognitively) to be "irrelevant."
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SOCIALIZATION

The various attributional messages that are potentially imparted by different
socialization techniques can lead to different behavioral results following temptation through any or all of the three processes described above. Additionally,
other variables are relevant in socialization, complicating prediction even further.
Thus while each socialization technique may lead to different attributions about
emotional arousal, each may be applied at varying levels of intensity, creating
differing arousal levels. Additionally, each child has a different ability to generate
and sustain emotional arousal, and children will certainly differ in their readiness
and ability to make attributional inferences from the same situation. The characteristics of the socialization agent, the background variables ofimmediate environment(physica1 andsocial),and the relationships that exist between the socialization
agents and child will also influence both the level of emotional arousal generated
by any socialization interaction and the child's attributions about the cause and
meaning of that emotional response. All these variables could interact in determining the effectiveness of any approach to the socialization of moral self-control
for each individual. Such complexity must lead to extreme caution in assuming
the validity of statements about the overall superiority of specific socialization
techniques; it is not surprising that research on the success of most techniques
has been quite inconsistent (Hoffman, 1970). Although the potential interactions
of relationship, individual differences, and socialization techniques are far too
numerous and complex for a comprehensive analysis in this chapter, I will discuss
some of the more significant factors and relationships. Many of these analyses
are admittedly highly speculative, and it will be obvious that much research
remains to be done before even moderate certainty is likely.
The ability to generate and sustain emotional arousal may be one of the most
important individual difference variables relating to socialization success. Such
differences, often labeled "temperment," have been identified by many researchers (e.g., Cattell, 1965; Buss, 1975; Martin, 1971) as due more to heredity
than to environmental variations (within American society). Most of the literature on socialization relates to that majority of children who come from the
broad middle of the continuum of ability to generate and sustain emotional
arousal and to those children who come from the high end, appearing anxious
and overstimulated. This is simply because for such children, normal socialization
works; whereas with psychopathic children - who evidence a lack of inhibiting
emotional reactions - little socialization or therapeutic success is generally
reported. Even within this normal group, the ability to generate and sustain
arousal related directly to the level of socialization, as indicated by the recent
work of Waid (1976). That work demonstrated that for a subject population
recruited through the Rutgers newspaper, greater skin conductance in response
to a loud tone corresponded to higher levels of socialization as indicated on the
CPI Socialization Scale. This phenomenon has been previously noted between
normal and psychopathic populations, with less skin conductance by the psycho-

pathic group in response to noxious stimulation (Hare, 1970). There are two
reasons for this more effective socialization of emokionally reactive children;
obviously, such children would experience more inhibiting arousal when facing
temptation, but it is also likely that less severe parental responses were needed
(and therefore utilized) in socialization, with the result that the child would be
more likely to attribute emotional arousal to the act of transgression, rather than
to the parental confrontation.

Induction. As defined by Hoffman (1970), induction involves the explanation to the child of why certain behaviors are right or wrong; it is, according to
Hoffman's review of socialization, a most effective technique for inducing moral
self-control. An emotion-attribution analysis would support and explain that
conclusion as follows: Following transgression and confrontation, even when
interaction between parent and child will proceed on a verbal level, some arousal
is quite likely, especially for the child who is higher in emotional reactivity. This
arousal will be due to the child's recognition that the parent (or other socialization agent) is unhappy with the child, that the child has transgressed against a
standard that may already be partially socialized (perhaps merely at the cognitive
level), and that some inconvenience or pain to the child may be forthcoming.
But by asking the child to focus upon the harm done by the act of transgression,
the child is induced to attribute that emotional discomfort - whatever the real
cause - to the transgression. When confronting later temptation, the emotional
discomfort resulting from the contemplation of transgression should be experienced as relevant and should play a role in aiding the resistance to that
temptation. Hoffman has convincingly presented the case that induction is the
most effective technique for the development of self-control; I would suggest
that this would be true for children in the middle to upper range of emotional
responsiveness; the likely ineffectiveness of induction for emotionally unresponsive children will be elaborated below.
Punishment. The literature on morality and socialization indicates that
when moral self-control is defined similarly to the manner used previously in
this paper (resistance to temptation under circumstances of perceiving that
detection for transgression is impossible), that punishment is ineffective - appearing to be negatively related to morality (Maurer, 1974). On the other hand,
some research has suggested that love withdrawal or "psychological" punishment
is positively related to self-control (e.g., Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957).
Punishment is obviously quite effective as a behavior control technique,
either when punishing agents will normally be present during temptation periods
(e.g., controlling social problems such as hitting adults) or if the organism is
not sufficiently developed cognitively to be able to know that there are detection-free contexts or t o recognize them with confidence when they occur.
However, its major limitation in inducing moral self-control, as defined above,
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is that more than any other technique the act of punishment draws to itself the
attribution of negative emotional arousal. The child with the stinging hand may
find it almost impossible to attribute the resultant emotional state to the act of
transgression rather than to the punishment. Yet, it is possible that judicious use
of punishment could be useful in eliciting emotional arousal that might (in later
similar transgression circumstances) be attributed to the transgression itself
rather than to the early (in socialization) punishment, especially in less emotionally
reactive children. However, remembering the relationship of misattribution and
emotional arousal level, positive results with punishment should hold most for
mild punishment of young children when it is delivered in conjunction with
internal emotion attributions (e.g., "you feel bad because you transgressed,"
etc.). With older children who are normal in emotional reactivity, a paradoxical
effect is predicted, with the more severely punished child manifesting less resistance to temptation, since such a child could make accurate emotion attributions
about the external cause of the emotional arousal. There is some evidence of
exactly that effect. In their chapter on the influence of punishment, Walters
and Parke (1967) reference their own research in which the impact of punishment intensity and timing interacted for 6- to 8-year-old boys. High-intensity
punishment was more effective in eliminating or delaying reaching for a "forbidden toy" in a 15-minute "alone" condition if administered early in the reaching
sequence; however, it was the low-intensity punishment that was most effective
if punishment was delivered late in the sequence (where it occurs in most natural
socialization). They suggested that the late, mild punishment might have served
as a more effective cue, allowing the association of the disapproved activity with
disapproval more than would be the case for the high-intensity punishment. My
interpretation would suggest that when elicited early in a behavioral sequence,
the emotional arousal resulting from punishment may be mistakenly attributed
to the act of transgression, since this attribution is facilitated by the temporal
contiguity (but even this effect should hold only for relatively young children).
On the other hand, once a transgression has been completed, if negative emotional arousal is then induced by a very salient (severe) external cause, the child
should be able t o clearly differentiate the punishment-induced emotional state
from the previous state associated with the transgression itself, facilitating the
attribution of the negative emotional state to the punishment. Thus a late, severe
punishment should be particularly ineffective for normal children. Emotionattribution theory can therefore provide an articulate framework for explaining
why punishment is negatively associated with the development of self-control
when used in the home and classroom.
When punishment is inconsistent, it should be even less effective, since the
child will be more able to correctly perceive the external cause of the negative
emotional state if it does not always follow identical transgressions. Similarly,
if an individual is punished very frequently, perhaps due to low emotional
reactivity (hence slow avoidance learning), strict parents, or due to living in

a particularly tempting environment, that individual too should learn more
accurately the real causes of emotional arousal and hence should be less likely
t o attribute negative emotional arousal t o the act of transgression. One can foresee the possibility of a vicious circle, with the lower emotional reactivity leading
to less emotional conditioning, resulting in more punishment, which would in
turn lead to more accurate attributions about the source of emotional arousal
following transgression; the ultimate result would be that moral development
would be substantially inhibited.
When punishment is ''psycho1ogica1" or love-oriented, on the other hand,
some authors have suggested that it is effective in the hands of warm parents
(i.e., Sears et al., 1957). If there is n o specific salient and identifiable parental
act of punishment in such cases, it may be easier for the child to misattribute
emotional arousal to the act of transgression rather than t o the punishment
itself. In short, if both physical and "psychological" punishment induce similar
arousal levels, the more tangible physical punishment should prove less effective
for the development of self-control. When the child perceives the parents to be
warm, it would be more difficult t o attribute to them and to their act of punishment the negative emotional response from the punishment, making attribution
to the transgression itself easier. We might also surmise that warm parents
probably tend to use milder punishments and more explanations, facilitating
internal attributions.
Psychopathy and Emotional Arousal
In his review of the psychologicalliterature relating to psychopathy, Hare (1970)
indicated the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has proposed that the
term "tension-discharge disorder, impulse-ridden personality" be used in place of
the term "psychopath" when applied to children. Hare (1970) described such an
individual as one with "little anxiety, internalized conflict, or guilt . . . with
failure to develop the capacity for tension storage and for the postponement
of gratifications [p. 51 ." (For this chapter I continue to use the term psychopath
for young and old.) Not only are psychopaths typically regarded as being "guiltless" and low in capacity for fear and/or anxiety, but as high in their need for
stimulation and thrill seeking. We focus first on the implications of the psychopath being unable t o develop or sustain emotional arousal from those socialization experiences that would cause negative emotional states in more normal
children.
It should be expected, if a lack of powerful and sustained emotional arousal is
the root problem of psychopathy and some habitual criminality, that the primary
focus of socialization and correctional techniques for such individuals might be
through procedures that reliably elicit high levels of emotional arousal (in normal
children), provided that those techniques are consistently applied and contingent
upon negative behavior. Hare (1970) has suggested that psychopathy "may very
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well represent the outcome of interactions between the characteristics (possibly
congenital) of the child and the socialization techniques employed [p. 1011 ."
He noted that cold, unaffectionate fathers who tend to be strict disciplinarians
have fewer psychopathic children and that strict discipline tends also to decrease
the incidence of adult psychopathy. But Hare's analysis should hold only if the
strict discipline is consistently applied, for the reasons detailed above. Inconsistent,
harsh discipline occasionally (noncontingently) applied should lead t o opposite
results, since accurate (external) attributions become quite likely under such a
regime. We would therefore expect that even with strict and consistent discipline
that real self-control, as defined herein, would be achieved only slightly by children who are chronically unresponsive emotionally, but that in detection-possible
situations such procedures would result in socially acceptable behaviors.
The picture that emerges is of an emotionally unresponsive individual who is
likely to become the target of increasingly harsh socialization as parents and
others become desperate to achieve positive change. But while that punishment
should lead to some conditioned emotional arousal when the psychopath faces
temptation, it should be quickly discounted in detection-free situations by the
psychopath as irrelevant, since correctly attributed to punishment. This would
be particularly true if the harsh discipline administered were inconsistent. There
is some evidence that a noncontingent, harsh environment is related to the
development of psychopathic behavior (e.g., Hare, 1970; Mandler, 1964; Kohlberg, 1958) and that even though psychopaths do evidence normal levels of
autonomic arousal under threatening conditions, they do not experience arousal
as inhibiting emotion (Schachter & Latand, 1964).
Let us return to the issue of the understimulated and stimulation-seeking
side of psychopathy. Hare has reported that even in controlled laboratory
situations, the psychopathic delinquent indicates a greater preference for levels
of complexity and novelty (associated with seeking higher arousal levels) than
normal controls. In their study of The Criminal Personality, Yochelson and
Samenow (1976), though reluctant to use the term psychopath, described the
habitual criminal as almost constantly seeking emotional stimulation, partly
through turning to criminal activity; thus crime is not just the logical result of
the lack of inhibitory control. Criminal activity may be experienced by the
psychopath as a positive emotional stimulant.
Indeed the psychopath's apparent need for criminal activity for its own sake
(rather than to remedy conditions of material deprivation, if we accept the thesis
of Youchelson and Samenow) provides some support for the idea that the criminal
experiences the emotional arousal associated with the risks of crime as a positive
emotional experience. That enjoyment of risk is apparently attained through the
elimination of the belief that capture is possible, rendering punishment-induced
emotional arousal irrelevant. Yochelson and Samenow discuss a process they
label "cutoff' in which the chronic criminal convinces himself that all forms
of danger are irrelevant to the ensuing crime.

It was suggested above that the misattribution of the cause of (and hence the
nature 00 certain emotions is maximized under conditions of low or moderate
emotional arousal; the process of re-experiencing the emotional state associated
with danger should therefore be relatively easy for the psychopath.
This reinterpretation of emotional arousal originally stimulated by punishment and later elicited by the temptation situation does not mean that all emotional states might easily be derived from that initial fear-stimulated arousal.
Discrete emotion theorists such as Izard (1971, 1972) and Plutchik (1962)
have suggested that certain emotions are somewhat alike in underlying arousal.
It should therefore be easier to reattribute or re-experience certain emotional
states as certain specific others, since some arousal components may be common
to a limited few similar states. (Certain arousal components may be common to
all emotional states that have sympathetic nervous system involvement, as
emphasized by Schachter and Singer [I9621 .) Specifically, for the present
issue, Hebb (1946) has noted that the arousal common to both fear and excitement allows easy transition between those two emotional experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

Often the imposition of a new theoretical system to a substantive area of venerable interest results in new insights into those traditional issues and problems.
Frequently, however, as new systems are embraced by theorists, momentum
carries the theory into areas well beyond its range of convenience, as evidenced
by claims of insight qualitatively superior t o that provided by other theoretical
systems. In this chapter I have attempted t o avoid both the image and the fact
of exaggerated claims; in fact, the major insight developed in this chapter could
be that the emotion-attribution approach leads to recognition that the issues of
moral socialization are far more complex than traditional moral judgment or
avoidance theories would suggest. In place of relatively simple universal insight
into moral development and socialization, I offer a theoretical pool muddied by
complexity. However, it is possible with continued research and development
that emotion-attribution theory will provide a means for establishing some order,
to the end that the most important elements of individual differences and of
socialization practices may be identified. A more articulate understanding of
the interactions of those elements may follow.
With several colleagues (Dienstbier et al., 1975) I have previously attempted
to use emotion-attribution concepts to understand the interrelationship of
moral judgment, as understood by Kohlberg (1958), with moral behavior approaches as derived from learning theory. Without resurrecting that discussion,
I shall elaborate briefly on the process of moral decision making, using emotionattribution concepts. It was argued, in the paper cited above, that in our society
the number of behaviors that elicit moral dilemmas are few, involving (usually)
pain inflicted upon others, honesty, and theft or destruction of property. As we
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mature, it is likely that different attributions about the specific temptation
situations will emerge; that is, with social and cognitive development, different
elements of an honesty situation may be important in defining the moral relevance
of potential action. (The initial reading-comprehension research with college
students reflects and illustrates this process.) But emotional responses may
arise even in situations where initial attributional processes were not conducive
to such response, for it is likely that the conditioned emotional response to such
situations will be less differentiated than those attribution processes. (The
research by Schachter and his colleagues with adrenalin and with the tranqualizer
chlorpromazine reflects the importance of the level of emotional arousal.) It
is suggested that one of the ways in which the individual decides which of
several behavioral choices are appropriate is through an assessment of the emotional arousal that follows thinking about each behavioral option. As the individual contemplates the behavioral options available, attempting simultaneously
to make judgments about how the relevant value should be hierarchically ordered,
emotion-attribution processes become important. Although our experience with
our subjects suggests that individuals are not aware of making such attributions
at a verbally articulate level, the research with adult subjects using placebo pills
with "arousal" side effects, the final reading comprehension study with adults,
and the research with children all reflect this process.
At each of the levels of decision making described previously, the degree to
which emotion is actually elicited, the attributions made, and the control those
attributions have over the meaning of the emotional response will depend on the
indivudal's capacity to develop and sustain arousal and the past socialization
history of the individual as that history influences both the quantity and quality
of emotional response developed in specific temptation situations.
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